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Abstract
We study insurance markets in which privately informed consumers can purchase
coverage from several insurers. Under adverse selection, multiple contracting severely
restricts feasible trades. Indeed, only one budget-balanced allocation is implementable
by an entry-proof tari, and each layer of coverage must be fairly priced given the
consumer types who purchase it. This allocation is the unique equilibrium outcome of a
game in which cross-subsidies between contracts are prohibited. Equilibrium contracts
exhibit quantity discounts and negative correlation between risk and coverage. Public
intervention should target insurers' strategic behavior, while consumers can be left free
to choose their preferred amount of coverage.
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1 Introduction
Multiple contracting, whereby individuals consumers purchase several policies from dierent
insurers to cover the same risk, is a widespread phenomenon in insurance markets. A case
in point is the US life-insurance market, in which around 25 percent of consumers hold more
than one term policy.1 A similar phenomenon arises in annuity markets: as an example,
the six million annuities in payment in the UK in 2013 were owned by about ve millions
individuals.2 Most health-insurance markets also exhibit multiple contracting, in forms that
depend on the relative importance of the public and private insurance sectors. First, private
health insurance can be used as a source of basic coverage for individuals who do not, or
choose not to, obtain public health insurance. In this case, which prevails in Germany,
Netherlands, and Switzerland, at least half of the insured households typically hold more
than one private policy.3 Second, private insurance can be used to cover healthcare needs
that are only partially covered by public funds. This role is prominent in Australia, Denmark,
and, in particular, France, where about 92 percent of the population complement the public
mandatory coverage with some private insurance.4 In the US, the Medicare supplementary
market performs a similar role, with 10 million out of the 42 million individuals covered
by Medicare also subscribing to Medigap plans issued by private insurers. The healthcare
services of retirees who supplement Medicare beneciaries with employer-sponsored retiree
health insurance represent an additional source of multiple contracting.5
Since the early works of Arrow (1963), Akerlof (1970), Pauly (1974), and Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1976), there has been a presumption that these insurance markets may be
exposed to adverse selection. More recently, a large body of empirical work has attempted
at providing a quantitative assessment of the extent to which this is the case, along two main
lines. First, the very existence of adverse selection has been investigated, leading to mixed
results.6 Second, several measures of the potential welfare costs of adverse selection have
1A term life policy provides coverage for a limited period of time, which makes it a pure insurance
product. Information about the buyers of such policies is provided by He (2009) on the basis of the Health
and Retirement Study (HRS) panel.
2See the 2014 UK Insurance Key Facts document issued by the Association of British Insurers, available
at https://www.abi.org.uk//media/Files/Documents/Publications/Public/2014/Key%20Facts/ABI%20K
ey%20Facts%202014.pdf.
3See Paccagnella, Rebba, and Weber (2013).
4See Thomson, Osborne, Squires, and Jun (2013).
5About half of the US retirees currently receive income from employment-based pension schemes, see
Poterba (2014).
6Cawley and Phillipson (1999) and Cardon and Hendel (2001) nd no evidence of adverse selection in the
US life- and health-insurance markets. Finkelstein and Poterba (2002, 2004) nd some evidence of adverse
selection using claims data from the UK annuity market. Hendren (2013) nds strong evidence of adverse
selection in the US life-insurance market when considering all potential customers, including rejected ones.
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been proposed.7 Yet a common feature of these empirical studies is the limited attention
devoted to the organization of markets and the nature of competition between insurers. This
is particularly true for multiple contracting, despite its being, as argued above, a key feature
of the markets under scrutiny. Indeed, standard tests for adverse selection, such as the
positive-correlation property|individuals facing a higher probability of a loss should receive
higher coverage|and the convex-pricing property|the unit price of coverage should increase
in the total amount of coverage purchased|are derived with reference to the Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976) model, in which each individual can purchase insurance from at most one
insurer.8 Accordingly, the standard empirical strategy relies on insurers' ability to induce
dierent individuals to self-select into dierent contracts.
This strategy may, however, lead to a fundamental misspecication problem. When an
individual engages in multiple contracting, each insurer has a limited basis for inferring her
total amount of coverage. This makes it more dicult for insurers to screen individuals
according to how much coverage they purchase, as this information is not directly available
to them. In addition, the impossibility of fully controlling individual transactions may
constitute an important source of welfare losses under adverse selection. These diculties
point to the need for a new theoretical framework, both for testing for the presence of adverse
selection in markets where multiple contracting is prevalent and for assessing the combined
welfare impact of adverse selection and multiple contracting.
We address these issues in a generalized version of the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)
economy, in which a risk-averse consumer trades insurance contracts simultaneously issued
by competing insurers. As in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), the consumer's risk is her private
information; an insurance contract stipulates a coverage or, in the case of coinsurance, a
coverage rate, in exchange for a premium. Trade is threatened by adverse selection: insurers
prefer to trade smaller amounts of coverage with riskier consumer types, who, however, are
willing to purchase a larger amount of coverage. Unlike in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976),
the consumer is free to purchase coverage from any number of insurers.
Central to our approach is to identify an appropriate notion of feasibility. To capture
the restrictions that informational and contracting frictions impose on feasible trades, we
characterize the set of allocations that can be achieved by a planner who observes neither
the consumer's risk nor her trades with private insurers. Whereas the constraints induced
See Cohen and Siegelman (2010) and Chiappori and Salanie (2013) for extensive surveys.
7See Einav, Finkelstein, and Levin (2010) for a survey.
8This approach is explicitly followed in the empirical analyses of Cawley and Phillipson (1999) and
Finkelstein and Poterba (2004), among many others.
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by private information on insurance provision are by now well understood,9 little is known
about how the opportunity for consumers to secretly sign bilateral agreements with private
insurers further restricts the set of feasible allocations.
To model these additional constraints, we require feasible allocations to be not only
incentive-compatible, but also robust to further trading opportunities provided by private
insurers. That is, any price-quantity scheme, or tari, posted by the planner must be entry-
proof. We show in Theorem 1 that a single budget-balanced allocation satises this robust
incentive-compatibility requirement. In that allocation, both low- and high-risk consumers
purchase the same basic amount of coverage, which the high-risk consumer complements by
purchasing some additional coverage. Each marginal amount of coverage, or layer, is fairly
priced given the consumer types who purchase it, which corresponds to a marginal version of
Akerlof (1970) pricing. This unique allocation, which was rst described by Jaynes (1978),
Hellwig (1988), and Glosten (1994), cannot a fortiori be improved in the Pareto sense without
making entry protable for a private insurer. Overall, the existence of private insurance
markets dramatically constrains the planner, making redistribution among dierent types of
consumers impossible.
It remains to understand to which extent private markets can perform their allocative role
in the absence of public intervention. In principle, multiple contracting aects the behavior
of private insurers along two main dimensions. On the one hand, each insurer can exploit the
oers of his competitors by proposing additional, possibly small, trades that are attractive to
the consumer. From a strategic viewpoint, this corresponds to enlarging the set of available
deviations with respect to the benchmark case in which exclusivity clauses are enforced
from the outset, as in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976); this makes undercutting an easier task
for insurers. On the other hand, cream-skimming deviations may be blocked by additional
threats which take the form of ad-hoc, latent contracts in one's competitors' oers; such
contracts may be thought of as playing an anti-competitive role. Equilibrium must hence
strike a delicate balance between these two forces, the interplay of which determines the
eective supply of insurance under multiple contracting.
A natural benchmark for equilibrium analysis is the situation in which competition is
fully nonexclusive, that is, insurers post arbitrary menu oers which the consumer is free to
combine. In this scenario, however, the set of trading opportunities available \in the dark" is
very large, and markets fail to be an eective device to allocate resources. Despite being the
only equilibrium candidate, the Jaynes{Hellwig{Glosten (JHG) allocation described above
9See, for instance, Prescott and Townsend (1984) and Crocker and Snow (1985).
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can only be decentralized in the degenerate case in which only the riskiest consumer is willing
to trade at the prevailing price; market equilibria otherwise fail to exist. The logic underlying
this result, extensively analyzed in Attar, Mariotti, and Salanie (2014, 2015), is that, in a
given candidate equilibrium, any of the incumbent insurers can make a prot by selling
basic coverage only to the low-risk consumer, while making a small loss by trading with the
high-risk consumer some complementary coverage priced at slightly better terms than by his
competitors. This sophisticated deviation involves cross-subsidization between contracts and
crucially exploits the nonexclusive nature of competition. The deviating insurer minimizes
his losses by sharing with his competitors the cost of providing a high coverage to the high-
risk consumer (\lemon dropping"); this in turn enables him to protably attract the low-risk
consumer (\cherry picking").
This fully nonexclusive scenario, however, does not provide an accurate description of
competition in modern insurance markets: the size of regulatory interventions in OECD
countries is suciently large to aect the conduct of these markets, the relevant degree of
information sharing, and the set of services available to consumers.10 Instead of providing a
detailed assessment of the impact of dierent waves of insurance regulation, let us stress that
the joint issuance of loss-making contracts and of contracts designed to make prots on basic
insurance may be particularly costly in several instances. In private insurance markets, a
loss-making contract is often identied as onerous, which forces insurers to recognize the net
obligation associated with it as an accrued liability and osetting expense in their nancial
statements. If the losses of such a contract are not simultaneously oset by the gains on
some other assets, onerous contracts may be a source of operational restructuring charges.11
In health insurance, several European countries, notably Germany and Switzerland, rely on
a central fund to redistribute costs among insurers according to a risk-equalization scheme.12
These cost-sharing mechanisms, by pooling and redistributing costs among sellers of a basic
standardized coverage contract, prevent insurers from earning abnormal prots on basic
insurance.13 This, again, casts serious doubt on the feasibility of the deviation specic to
10In 2010, the US State Insurance Departments employed about 12,000 regulatory workers, collecting
around $19 billion in revenues from insurance sources.
11At the beginning of the 21st century, no International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) for insurance
contracts existed. Since then, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has introduced several
measures to provide a unied treatment of the principles that an entity should apply to report information
to users of its nancial statements about the nature, amount, timing, and uncertainty of cash ows from
insurance contracts (IASB (2013)). In particular, since 2011, insurers have to perform an onerous-contract
test when facts and circumstances indicate that the contract might be onerous, with the unavoidable cost
required to fulll the agreement being higher than its economic benet.
12See Thomson and Mossialos (2009, page 84). Besides Germany and Switzerland, other countries using
such schemes include Australia, Ireland, Netherlands, and Slovenia.
13In Switzerland, the basic coverage contract is dened at the national level; then insurers compete over
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the fully nonexclusive scenario.
In light of these remarks, it is important to derive predictions for competitive insurance
markets in which insurers cannot engage into cross-subsidization between dierent contracts.
A parsimonious way to achieve this goal is to consider a game in which insurers can only
make simple take-it-or-leave-it oers, so that regulation prevents from the outset rms from
destabilizing the market through dumping practices. This restriction does not undermine
the power of competition under multiple contracting. Indeed, we show in Theorem 2 that
the JHG allocation remains the only candidate equilibrium allocation even in this single-
contract game: multiple contracting allows rms to Bertrand-compete over take-it-or-leave-it
contracts on each layer of coverage, in a way that would not be feasible under exclusivity. We
moreover identify necessary conditions for equilibrium existence. First, high-risk consumers
must not be willing to purchase twice the basic coverage. This reects the idea that no private
insurer is indispensable in a market equilibrium. Second, the amount of complementary
coverage purchased by a high-risk consumer should not exceed that of the basic coverage.
This prevents private insurers from protably conducting additional trades with high-risk
consumers on top of any available amount of basic coverage. Last, we provide in Theorem
3 a condition on consumers' preferences that ensure that these necessary conditions are also
sucient to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium. Together with Theorem 1, Theorems
2 and 3 provide weak versions of the First and Second Welfare Theorems for our economy:
every equilibrium implements the only budget-balanced allocation that is robustly incentive-
compatible, and this allocation can be implemented in a market equilibrium under additional
conditions on consumer preferences.
Overall, our equilibrium analysis suggests new avenues for empirical research on adverse
selection. When a market equilibrium exists, consumers end up trading with several insurers,
as observed in practice. Empirical exercises may therefore be performed by considering
consumer surveys or, alternatively, by looking at insurer-level data. These two approaches
are treated as equivalent in recent empirical work, reecting the fact that, under exclusive
contracting, any consumer's demand for coverage must be met by a single contract. But
this equivalence collapses as soon as consumers trade several contracts: while the positive-
prices to provide the corresponding amount of coverage. Yet, an additional rule species that costs are pooled
and redistributed among insurers. In Germany, the basic coverage contract is also dened at the national
level and is oered by 134 not-for-prot, nongovernmental \sickness funds." Insurees contribute a xed
fraction of their wealth; these contributions are then centrally pooled and redistributed to sickness funds
according to a rather precise risk-adjusted capitation formula. More generally, risk equalization involves
transfer payments between health insurers so as to spread some of the claims cost of the high-risk, older, and
less healthy members among all the private health insurers in the market, in proportion to their respective
market shares.
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correlation and the convex-pricing properties hold at the consumer level, the contracts oered
by insurers exhibit a negative correlation between risk and coverage, and display quantity
discounts. In this respect, our results challenge the negative conclusions reached by Cawley
and Philipson (1999) and Cardon and Hendel (2001) when testing for adverse selection: by
putting at the center stage of our analysis the actual organization of insurance markets, we
can reconcile the predictions of the theory with the broad features of the data on insurance
markets in which multiple contracting is a prominent feature.
Yet, our analysis also shows that market equilibria fail to exist in many circumstances.
That is, private insurers' strategic behavior may have a destabilizing eect even when cross-
subsidization between contracts is not feasible. As multiple contracting raises a fundamental
obstacle against redistribution, a failure in the market allocative mechanism calls for some
nonstandard normative implications: although the state has no redistributive role, it may
play an active role in the allocation process.
We discuss several instances of such interventions in the context of health insurance.
We rst argue that multiple contracting is compatible with mandatory systems in which the
state provides basic insurance. However, to the extent that enforcing such programs may end
up being particularly expensive, we next show how the simple threat of the state standing
ready to complement private insurance is sucient to implement the JHG allocation in a
market equilibrium. That is, basic coverage can be provided taking into account both the
incentives of private insurers and the consumers' freedom to choose among them.
More generally, our results suggest novel insights for the design of public interventions
in nancial markets plagued by adverse selection. A prominent example is the interbank
market: we argue that, under the threat of multiple contracting, an optimal lending program
may need to pool all types of each borrower. This challenges the recently advocated view
that such programs should target the least protable borrowers, so as to unfreeze the market
faced by private banks.
Contributions to the Literature Starting with the early contributions of Hammond
(1979, 1987), Allen (1985), and Jacklin (1987), several authors have attempted at identifying
the constraints on risk sharing that arise when agents are free to engage in side trades in
nancial markets. Such trades are typically formalized by letting privately informed agents
free to exchange commodities in Walrasian markets, so that they can complement their
trades with the planner by trading at linear prices. This exacerbates the tension between
incentive compatibility and optimal insurance. In private-value environments, von Thadden
(1999), Cole and Kocherlakota (2001), Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007), and Farhi, Golosov and
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Tsyvinski (2009) show how, given the threat of hidden borrowing and saving, optimality may
involve agents receiving no additional insurance beyond self-insurance. The same allocation
can also be supported in an equilibrium of a strategic game featuring competition among
private insurers (Ales and Maziero (2016)). This approach, however, is hard to reconcile
with adverse selection, as the identity of one's trading partner then matters over and above
the terms of trade that are settled on.
The present paper extends these analyses by considering a common-value environment in
which a privately informed consumer can purchase coverage from competing private insurers.
The unique robustly incentive-compatible allocation features cross-subsidization between
dierent consumer types, so that additional trading opportunities are eectively exploited
despite adverse selection and multiple contracting. In particular, this allocation does not
coincide with the one arising in a competitive market in which the consumer can only self-
insure through savings.
Despite the practical relevance of nancial markets in which consumers' aggregate trades
cannot be fully monitored, few attempts have been made to incorporate multiple contracting
in a theoretical analysis of decentralized markets under adverse selection. Indeed, adverse-
selection extensions of the Walrasian paradigm (Prescott and Townsend (1984), Dubey and
Geanakoplos (2002), Bisin and Gottardi (2006)) and of the competitive-search approach
(Gale (1996), Guerrieri, Shimer and Wright (2010)) postulate exclusive contracting from the
outset. An alternative route has been suggested by Bisin and Gottardi (1999), who study
private information economies in which, due to nonexclusivity, prices are restricted to be
linear with respect to aggregate trades.14 Yet, under adverse selection, linear pricing turns
out not to be robust to sellers' strategic manipulations whenever multiple contracting is taken
into account. Indeed, Attar, Mariotti and Salanie (2015) show that, in such circumstances,
it is always protable for at least one seller to reduce the riskiness of his portfolio by reducing
the maximal amount of coverage that he stands ready to sell at a given price.
Modeling nonexclusive competition under adverse selection has been at the center stage
of several reformulations of the competitive-screening literature initiated by Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976), Miyazaki (1977), Spence (1977), and Wilson (1977). Attar, Mariotti and
Salanie (2011, 2014) show that nonexclusivity worsens the impact of adverse selection. Pure-
strategy equilibria may fail to exist, and when they exist they necessarily feature the market
breakdown emphasized by Akerlof (1970). Besides, although individuals can enter several
trading agreements, equilibrium need not feature multiple contracting. Biais, Martimort,
14Bisin and Gottardi (2003) argue that a \minimal" degree of nonlinearity, in the form of a bid-ask spread,
may be needed to guarantee equilibrium existence.
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and Rochet (2000, 2013) and Back and Baruch (2012) analyze the strategic interaction
between liquidity suppliers who post price-quantity schedules to match the market order
of a privately informed trader. When there are nitely many market makers, each of them
earns a strictly positive prot; the JHG allocation only obtains in the limit when the number
of market makers goes to innity. As each type of the trader symmetrically splits his market
order between all market makers, the equilibrium does not require the trade of qualitatively
dierent contracts, unlike our basic and complementary coverage contracts.
We contribute to this strategic approach by building a competitive-screening game in
which the JHG allocation is the only allocation that can be sustained in a pure-strategy
equilibrium, and individual trades feature multiple contracting. To implement this outcome,
we do not rely on alternative extensive forms which allow sellers to condition their behaviors
on their competitors' oers, as in Hellwig (1988), or let the buyer solicit additional proposals
from an innite sequence of sellers' cohorts, as in Beaudry and Poitevin (1995). Rather, we
only require sellers to be prevented from exploiting cross-subsidization between contracts, in
line with existing regulation of several insurance markets.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 shows that
the JHG allocation is the only budget-balanced allocation that is robust to side trades with
private insurers. Section 4 provides an implemention of the JHG allocation in a competitive
economy and discusses the testable implications of equilibrium. Section 5 draws the lessons of
our analysis for public intervention in insurance and nancial markets. Section 6 concludes.
Proofs not given in the text can be found in the online Appendices A and B.
2 The Economy
In this section, we describe an adverse-selection insurance economy in which a risk-averse
buyer can purchase coverage from several risk-neutral sellers. We allow for a large class of
convex preferences for the buyer, only assumed to be ordered by a single-crossing property.
As a result, our framework is quite general and can be used to model other nancial markets.
2.1 The Buyer
The buyer is privately informed of her preferences. She may be of two types, i = 1; 2, with
positive probabilities m1 and m2 such that m1+m2 = 1. Type i's preferences over aggregate
coverage-premium pairs (Q; T ) 2 R+  R are represented by a utility function Ui. We
assume that Ui is twice continuously dierentiable, with @Ui=@T < 0, and that Ui is strictly
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quasiconcave.15 Hence type i's marginal rate of substitution of coverage for premium,
i    @Ui=@Q
@Ui=@T
; (1)
is everywhere well dened and strictly decreasing along her indierence curves. The following
single-crossing (SC) assumption is key to our results.
Assumption SC For each (Q; T ) 2 R+  R; 2(Q; T ) > 1(Q; T ).
Geometrically, in the (Q; T ) plane, an indierence curve for type 2 crosses an indierence
curve for type 1 only once, from below. As a result, type 2 is more eager to increase her
purchase of coverage than type 1 is.
2.2 The Sellers
There are n  3 identical risk-neutral sellers. If a seller provides type i with coverage q for
a premium t, he earns an expected prot t   viq, where the cost vi of serving type i is her
risk. The following common-value (CV) assumption is maintained throughout the analysis.
Assumption CV v2 > v1.
Thus type 2 represents a greater risk for sellers than type 1 does. Along with Assumption
SC, Assumption CV generates adverse selection: type 2 is more willing to trade at the margin
than type 1 is, but she faces sellers who are less willing to trade with her than with type 1.
We let v  m1v1 +m2v2 be the average risk of the buyer, so that v2 > v > v1.
2.3 Contracts and Trades
The rst step of our analysis does not require that we describe in detail the precise structure
of the sellers' oers; this will be done in Section 4. Rather, following Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976), we represent supply by a set of contracts simultaneously made available to the buyer,
and which she is free to combine at will.
Contracts are bilateral: each seller monitors the amount of coverage the buyer purchases
from him, but not the amounts of coverage the buyer purchases from his competitors. As
a result, a contract between the buyer and a seller is just a coverage-premium pair (q; t) 2
R+R. The no-trade contract is (0; 0) and a contract (q; t) with positive coverage has unit
price t=q.
15One can dispense with the dierentiability requirement, but this generalization comes at the price of
more cumbersome statements and proofs.
9
After privately learning her type, the buyer chooses from the set of available contracts.
In this respect, the only dierence with Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) is that she can choose
to trade multiple contracts with dierent sellers. Thus, letting K be the set of sellers with
whom a given type of the buyer chooses to trade, and (qk; tk) be the contract she trades with
seller k 2 K, her aggregate trade is (Q; T )  (Pk2K qk;Pk2K tk).
2.4 Examples
2.4.1 The Rothschild{Stiglitz Economy
Our rst example is the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) economy, only modied to allow
for multiple contracting. The buyer has initial wealth W0 and faces the risk of a loss L
with a probability vi 2 (0; 1) that denes her type. Type i's preferences over aggregate
coverage-premium pairs have an expected-utility representation
Ui(Q; T )  viu(W0   L+Q  T ) + (1  vi)u(W0   T ); (2)
where u is a twice continuously dierentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave von
Neumann{Morgenstern utility function. Assumption CV states that type 2 has a higher
probability of incurring a loss than type 1. This implies that her willingness to substitute
coverage for premium is everywhere higher than type 1's, which is Assumption SC.
2.4.2 Coinsurance
Our next example allows for multiple loss levels, while focusing on coinsurance contracts.
Thus a contract (q; t) species that a fraction q of the loss is covered for a premium t, and
multiple contracts can be additively aggregated in a natural way. The buyer has initial
wealthW0 and faces the risk of a loss L distributed according to a density fi that denes her
type. Type i's preferences over aggregate coverage-premium pairs have an expected-utility
representation
Ui(Q; T ) 
Z
u(W0   (1 Q)L  T )fi(L) dL; (3)
where u is a twice continuously dierentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave von
Neumann{Morgenstern utility function. Assumption SC is satised if f2 dominates f1 in
the monotone-likelihood-ratio order, that is, if type 2 is relatively more likely to incur large
losses than type 1 is. This, in turn, implies that she is more costly to serve than type 1 is,
v2 =
R
Lf2(L) dL >
R
Lf1(L) dL = v1, which is Assumption CV.
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2.4.3 Financial Markets
Our last example is a market-microstructure model inspired by Biais, Martimort, and Rochet
(2000, 2013) and Back and Baruch (2013). The buyer is an insider who can purchase shares
of a risky asset from sellers acting as market makers. The buyer maximizes expected utility
with constant absolute risk aversion  and faces residual Gaussian noise with variance 2.
Type i's preferences over aggregate share-money pairs are thus represented by
Ui(Q; T )  iQ  
2
2
Q2   T; (4)
where type i's marginal valuation i reects her informational and risk-sharing motivations
to trade the asset. Assumption SC requires 2 > 1. The market makers are risk-neutral
and the cost vi of selling a share of the asset to type i is its expected value conditional on
the insider's being of type i. Assumption CV requires that this expected value be higher for
type 2 than for type 1.
2.4.4 On the Assumptions of the Model
Our focus on general preferences allows us to avoid relying on particular properties of,
for instance, the expected-utility model. In fact, we can handle non-expected utilities in
our framework, provided these preferences are: (i) consequentialist, in the sense that the
agent only cares about the distribution of nal outcomes, and: (ii) suciently regular, such
as, for instance, the Frechet-dierentiable preferences introduced by Machina (1982). As
shown by the coinsurance example, we can also handle multiple loss levels, as long as the
additive aggregation of insurance contracts is consistent; as a counter-example, contracts
with deductibles do not aggregate in this way. Overall, what really matters is that insurance
coverage can be summarized by a one-dimensional additive index, and that preferences satisfy
a single-crossing property along that dimension.
3 Robust Incentive Compatibility
In this section, we introduce the notion of incentive compatibility that is relevant for our
multiple-contracting setting and we show that a unique budget-balanced allocation satises
this property.
3.1 Denition
In the benchmark situation where a planner can design an incentive-compatible trading
mechanism while perfectly monitoring trades (Myerson (1979, 1982), Harris and Townsend
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(1981)), the Taxation Principle tells us that he can with no loss of generality oer a tari
specifying a transfer T P (Q) to be paid as a function of the aggregate coverage Q demanded
by the buyer (Hammond (1979), Guesnerie (1981), Rochet (1985)).16
Denition 1 The tari T P implements the allocation ((Q1; T1); (Q2; T2)) if; for each i;
Qi 2 argmaxfUi(Q; T P (Q)) : Q  0g;
Ti = T
P (Qi):
Incentive compatibility is the relevant notion of feasibility when the planner can perfectly
monitor trades. As such, it is key to the characterization of the second-best eciency frontier
obtained by Prescott and Townsend (1984) and Crocker and Snow (1985a) in the Rothschild{
Stiglitz economy, which provides a benchmark for assessing insurance-market outcomes when
each seller is able to enforce exclusivity.
In our multiple-contracting setting, however, no outside party can monitor the trades
between the buyer and any seller. To incorporate the additional constraints that this imposes
on the planner, we require that the tari T P be robust to entry: that is, no seller can
protably oer additional contracts that the buyer can trade along with some amount of
coverage oered by the planner. To precisely model this, observe that the Taxation Principle
again implies that, once the planner has oered his tari, the best an entrant can do is also
to oer a tari TE. This motivates the following denition.
Denition 2 The tari T P is entry-proof if; for any tari TE oered by an entrant; there
exists for each i a solution (qPi ; q
E
i ) to type i's problem
maxfUi(qP + qE; T P (qP ) + TE(qE)) : qP  0 and qE  0g (5)
such that the expected prot of the entrant is at most zero;
m1[T
E(qE1 )  v1qE1 ] +m2[TE(qE2 )  v2qE2 ]  0: (6)
That is, the tari oered by the planner is entry-proof if, no matter the tari subsequently
oered by an entrant, there is an optimal way for the buyer to combine these oers that
prevents the entrant from making a prot. Notice that we confer the entrant a lot of
power by allowing him to oer an arbitrary tari. This contrasts with models of optimal
allocation under private information in the presence of hidden trades, in which it is typically
16For any tari T , we set T (0)  0 to deal with participation in a simple way, and we set T (Q)  1 if
the tari does not allow the buyer to trade the coverage Q.
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assumed that such trades take place on Walrasian markets (Hammond (1979, 1987), Cole and
Kocherlakota (2001), Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007), Farhi, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2009)).
In the present context, this assumption would amount to restrict the entrant to oer a
linear tari. Whereas this assumption is perhaps relatively innocuous in the private-value
environments that have been studied in the literature, it is much less natural in our adverse-
selection environment, if only because sellers have an incentive to restrict the maximum
amount of coverage they oer at any given price.
Our concept of robust incentive compatibility then naturally follows from Denitions 1{2.
Denition 3 An allocation is robustly incentive-compatible if there exists an entry-proof
tari that implements it.
Remark The requirement that a robustly incentive-compatible allocation be implementable
by an entry-proof tari is reminiscent of the denition by Kahn and Mookherjee (1998) or
Bisin and Guaitoli (2004) of third-best allocations in moral-hazard environments; in such
an allocation, the incentive contract oered by the planner must deter sellers from oering
additional contracts. This requirement is also reminiscent of Laont and Martimort's (1997)
collusion-proofness principle.
3.2 The JHG Allocation
We now describe an allocation, introduced by Jaynes (1978), Hellwig (1988), and Glosten
(1994), that plays a central role in our analysis. In this allocation, both type 1 and type
2 purchase the same basic coverage, which type 2 complements by purchasing additional
coverage. A marginal version of Akerlof (1970) pricing holds: each layer of coverage is fairly
priced given the types who purchase it, and the size of each layer is optimally chosen subject
to this constraint. This calls for a recursive denition. The rst layer Q1 is optimal for type
1 at the average premium rate v,
Q1  argmaxfU1(Q; vQ) : Q  0g; (7)
T 1  vQ1: (8)
Then the second layer Q2  Q1 is optimal for type 2 at unit price v2, given that she already
purchases the rst layer Q1 at the average premium rate v,
Q2  Q1  argmaxfU2(Q1 +Q; T 1 + v2Q) : Q  0g; (9)
T 2   T 1  v2(Q2  Q1): (10)
13
Because each layer of coverage is fairly priced given the types who purchase it, the JHG
allocation ((Q1; T

1 ); (Q

2; T

2 )) makes zero expected prot. However, if Q

1 > 0, the aggregate
coverages Q1 and Q

2 of types 1 and 2 are not fairly priced: because the coverage Q

1 is sold
at the average premium rate v > v1, type 1 subsidizes type 2. Figure 1 depicts the JHG
allocation in the case where both layers Q1 and Q

2  Q1 are positive.
-
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I1
r
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T 1
I2
r
v2
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Figure 1 The JHG allocation.
Remark Jaynes (1978) and Hellwig (1988) assume as we do that there are nitely many
buyer types, so that their denition coincides with the above one. This contrasts with Glosten
(1994), who assumes that demand is continuously distributed. Despite this dierence, the
key feature shared by the allocations described by these authors is that the marginal price
of any amount of coverage is the upper-tail conditional expectation of the cost of serving
the types who buy at least that amount. It is interesting to compare this price structure to
that arising under monopoly. According to Wilson's (1993) demand-prole interpretation,
the layers Qm1 and Q
m
2   Qm1 sold by a monopolist are priced in a prot-maximizing way,
given the types who purchase them. By contrast, in the JHG allocation, the layers Q1 and
Q2  Q1 are priced in a competitive way, given the types who purchase them.
In the Rothschild{Stiglitz economy, type 2 obtains full coverage in the JHG allocation,
Q2 = L, while type 1 obtains less than full coverage, Q

1 < L. In the coinsurance example,
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we similarly have Q2 = 1 and Q

1 < 1. In both cases, type 2's optimal complementary layer
of coverage Q2 Q1 is strictly positive at the fair premium rate. From (9), this implies that
her incentive-compatibility constraint is slack, U2(Q

2; T

2 ) > U2(Q

1; T

1 ).
It follows from this observation that, in these two key examples, the JHG allocation
does not belong to the second-best eciency frontier. Indeed, because type 1 obtains less
than full coverage, she is willing to purchase additional coverage at the fair premium rate,
that is, 1(Q

1; T

1 ) > v1. A planner with the ability to perfectly control trades can then
slightly perturb the JHG allocation by complementing type 1's aggregate trade (Q1; T

1 )
with additional coverage at a premium rate between v1 and 1(Q

1; T

1 ), thereby increasing
her utility. As long as the additional amount of coverage involved is small enough, this does
not cause type 2 to deviate from her aggregate trade (Q2; T

2 ), and the planner even achieves
a small positive expected budget surplus.
This reasoning fails when the planner cannot perfectly control trades. Indeed, increasing
the coverage sold to type 1 beyond Q1 at a unit price less than 1(Q

1; T

1 ) now makes it
feasible for an entrant to attract type 2 with complementary coverage at a premium rate
slightly above the fair premium rate; the reason is that type 2 can now combine such coverage
with the coverage intended by the planner for type 1. Thus an entrant can exploit the trades
oered by the planner to make a prot, leading to a decit for the planner. This reects
that, under multiple contracting, the relevant analogue of a binding incentive-compatibility
constraint for type 2 is (9) or, equivalently,
U2(Q

2; T

2 ) = maxfU2(Q1 +Q; T 1 + v2Q) : Q  0g;
which states that she is indierent between trading (Q2; T

2 ) and trading (Q

1; T

1 ) along with
contracts issued by an entrant at the fair premium rate v2.
3.3 Characterization
The above remarks suggest that the threat of entry severely limits the scope for improving on
the JHG allocation. Our rst result conrms this intuition by showing that our robustness
criterion drastically reduces the set of feasible allocations.
Theorem 1 The JHG allocation is the unique budget-balanced allocation that is robustly
incentive-compatible.
Because the argument is simple and instructive, we give its main structure in the body
of the paper, leaving a few technical details for Appendix A.
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We rst show uniqueness. A robustly incentive-compatible allocation ((Q1; T1); (Q2; T2))
must satisfy Q2  Q1 by Assumption SC and, additionally,
U1(Q1; T1)  maxfU1(Q; vQ) : Q  0g; (11)
because, otherwise, an entrant can oer a contract with a unit price slightly above v that
protably attracts type 1 and that is protable even if it also attracts type 2. Similarly,
((Q1; T1); (Q2; T2)) must also satisfy
U2(Q2; T2)  maxfU2(Q1 +Q; T1 + v2Q) : Q  0g; (12)
because, otherwise, an entrant can oer a contract with a unit price slightly above v2 that
protably attracts type 2 along with the aggregate trade (Q1; T1) and that is even more
protable if it also attracts type 1. These two inequalities imply
T1  vQ1 (13)
and
T2  T1 + v2(Q2  Q1); (14)
so that the budget-balance constraint, which can be rewritten as
T1   vQ1 +m2[T2   T1   v2(Q2  Q1)]  0;
is satised if and only if all inequalities (11){(14) are in fact equalities. Together with the
recursive denition (7){(10), this implies that the robustly incentive-compatible allocation
((Q1; T1); (Q2; T2)) must coincide with the JHG allocation.
To show existence, we only need to exhibit a tari for the planner that implements
the JHG allocation and that is entry-proof. For this purpose, consider the piecewise-linear
convex tari
T P (q)  1fqQ1gvq + 1fq>Q1g[vQ1 + v2(q  Q1)]; (15)
which is the analogue in our two-type setting of the tari constructed by Glosten (1994)
when demand is continuously distributed. According to (7){(10), T P implements the JHG
allocation. Consider now what happens when an entrant oers a tari TE. As shown in
Appendix A, the convexity of T P implies that there exist solutions (qP1 ; q
E
1 ) and (q
P
2 ; q
E
2 ) to
(5) for i = 1; 2 such that qE2  qE1 . Now, as T P allows type 1 to buy her optimal coverage
Q1 at unit price v, one must have
TE(qE1 )  vqE1 : (16)
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Next, because qE2  qE1 , type 2 can purchase the same aggregate coverage qP2 + qE2 by trading
(qE1 ; t
E
1 ) with the entrant and purchasing complementary coverage q
P
2 + q
E
2   qE1 from the
planner, paying overall T P (qP2 + q
E
2   qE1 ) + TE(qE1 ). As she pays T P (qP2 ) + TE(qE2 ) instead,
one must have
TE(qE2 )  TE(qE1 )  T P (qP2 + qE2   qE1 )  T P (qP2 ): (17)
Because T P is convex with slope at most v2 and q
E
2  qE1 ,
T P (qP2 + q
E
2   qE1 )  T P (qP2 )  v2(qE2   qE1 ): (18)
Collecting (16) and (17){(18) leads to
TE(qE1 )  vqE1 +m2[TE(qE2 )  TE(qE1 )  v2(qE2   qE1 )]  0;
so that the expected prot of the entrant is at most zero, as requested by (6). This concludes
the proof of Theorem 1.
Remark Note that the JHG allocation emerges as the unique candidate for a robustly
incentive-compatible and budget-balanced allocation even when the entrant is restricted to
oer a single contract, whereas the tari (15) is robust to entry even when the entrant can
oer an arbitrary tari. This contrasts with Glosten's (1994) characterization of an entry-
proof tari when demand is continuously distributed, which crucially relies on the entrant
oering a tari satisfying a property he dubs \single crossing" and that generalizes convexity.
Another dierence with Glosten (1994) is that we do not request the buyer's preferences to
be quasilinear. In fact, our characterization is very general and does not even rely on an
expected-utility representation for the buyer's preferences such as (2), (3), or (4).
3.4 Discussion
3.4.1 Sorting and Tie Breaking
Our denition of an entry-proof tari only requires that, given any tari of the entrant, the
buyer has a best response such that the entrant does not make a prot. Hence we do not
require this no-prot property to be satised for all best responses of the buyer. This rules
out positive sorting, whereby the entrant would be able to break the buyer's ties in his favor.
The existence part in the proof of Theorem 1 exploited this degree of freedom by considering
a best response of the buyer in which type 2 purchases at least as much coverage from the
entrant as type 1 does.17
17By contrast, allowing the entrant to select the buyer's best response, in line with Peters' (2001) and
Han's (2007) strongly robust equilibrium renement, would undermine the existence of an entry-proof tari.
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3.4.2 Uniqueness and Existence
According to Theorem 1, robustness to entry pins down a unique budget-balanced allocation.
This shows that the planner is severely constrained by his inability to control the buyer's
trades with a potential entrant, as the threat of such trades eectively deprives him of any
possibility to transfer utility between the two types. This contrasts with the multiplicity
of second-best allocations, which, in the Rothschild{Stiglitz economy, for instance, form
a nondegenerate frontier. The possibility of multiple contracting is key to this result, as
exclusive contracting would allow the planner to prevent entry.
Another important insight of Theorem 1 is that, no matter the distribution of types, there
always exists a budget-balanced allocation that is implementable by an entry-proof tari.
This contrasts with the exclusive case, in which an entry-proof allocation can robustly fail to
exist: for instance, under exclusivity, the only candidate for an entry-proof allocation in the
Rothschild{Stiglitz economy is not robust to entry with a pooling contract if the proportion
of type-1 buyers is too high. The dierence is that an entrant in the exclusive case can
fully control the buyer's trades, whereas, in our setting, any contract he may oer can be
combined by the buyer with the contracts oered by the planner. Although this enlarges the
set of contracts an entrant can oer to attract the buyer, this also gives the planner more
instruments to deter entry, as we shall now see.
3.4.3 Allocations, Taris, and Latent Contracts
An important property of the tari (15) we use to implement the JHG allocation is that it
allows the buyer to trade other amounts of coverage than Q1 and Q

2. This contrasts with
the case in which the planner can fully monitor trades: according to the Revelation Principle
(Myerson (1979, 1982)), taris then need not include trades other than the ones the planner
wishes to implement and, therefore, in our two-type setting, involve at most two positive
amounts of coverage. That is, taris need not be distinguished from allocations in that case.
This distinction, however, is crucial under multiple contracting.
To clarify this point, consider the conguration illustrated in Figure 2, where it is assumed
that the JHG allocation is such that Q1 > Q

2   Q1 > 0 and U2(Q2; T 2 ) > U2(2Q1; 2T 1 ).
Suppose the only nonzero trades made available by the planner are (Q1; T

1 ) and (Q

2; T

2 ).
Now, consider the contract (q; t) as shown. This contract allows the buyer to purchase an
amount of coverage less than but close to Q1 at a unit price lower than v. It certainly
attracts type 1 and yields a strictly positive prot to an entrant oering it if it does not
attract type 2. To see that this is indeed the case, observe that combining (q; t) with (Q1; T

1 )
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or, a fortiori, (Q2; T

2 ), leaves type 2 with a strictly lower utility than just trading (Q

2; T

2 )
with the planner.18 An entrant oering the contract (q; t) can thus cream skim type 1 and
make a prot. Hence, in this conguration, the JHG allocation is not, per se, entry-proof.
-
6
Q
T
I1
r
v
I2
r
v2
r
q
t
r
Q1 + q
T 1 + t
Figure 2 Cream skimming type 1.
This example shows that, to implement the JHG allocation in an entry-proof way, the
planner may have to issue additional, latent contracts, which are not traded by the buyer
but are only meant to block entry. For instance, in the above example, the attempt at cream
skimming type 1 with contract (q; t) is defeated if the buyer can trade, in addition to it,
any amount of coverage up to Q1 at unit price v, for then type 2 is also attracted by (q; t).
Observe that, whereas such contracts may be necessary, the planner must make sure that,
by merely oering them, he does not create further protable entry opportunities. The tari
(15) strikes a balance between these two requirements.
4 Implementation
Whether incentive-compatible allocations can be implemented as equilibrium outcomes is
a fundamental question for evaluating how markets perform under adverse selection. Bisin
18This is because (Q1 + q; T

1 + t) is close to (2Q

1; 2T

1 ) and thus is, by assumption, strictly less preferred
by type 2 than (Q2; T

2 ), and because (Q

2 + q; T

2 + t) is even less preferred by type 2 than (Q

1 + q; T

1 + t)
as 2(Q

1 + q; T

1 + t) < v2 and the unit price of the layer Q

2  Q1 in the JHG allocation is v2.
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and Gottardi (2006) provide a positive answer in the case of fully observable trades: for
any second-best allocation, there exists a system of transfers ensuring that this allocation
obtains in a competitive equilibrium of an economy in which sellers oer exclusive contracts.
When sellers cannot enforce exclusivity, however, the decentralization of the JHG allocation
raises the issue of specifying a competitive environment in which sellers do not observe the
buyer's aggregate trade. In this section, we address this issue by motivating and studying a
parsimonious model of trade under adverse selection in which the JHG allocation emerges,
under circumstances we characterize, as the unique equilibrium allocation.
4.1 The Nonexclusive Benchmark
As a benchmark, it is useful to start with the fully nonexclusive situation where no restrictions
are imposed on the set of contractual instruments available to any seller, subject to the
constraint that he cannot monitor the trades that the buyer makes with his competitors.
According to the Delegation Principle (Peters (2001), Martimort and Stole (2002)), there is
no loss of generality in assuming that sellers compete by oering arbitrary menus of bilateral
contracts or, equivalently, arbitrary taris, from which the buyer is then free to choose
according to her information. Attar, Mariotti, and Salanie (2014) provide a general analysis
of this arbitrary-menu game for the economy studied in this paper.
The main insight of their analysis is that a positive level of trade for type 2 can be
sustained in equilibrium only if type 1 is left out of the market. As a result, the only
allocation that can be supported in equilibrium is a degenerate JHG allocation in which
(Q1; T

1 ) = (0; 0). That is, type 1 purchases no coverage at the average premium rate v,
while type 2 obtains full coverage at the actuarially fair rate v2. A necessary and sucient
condition for implementation is 1(0; 0)  v, that is, Akerlof's (1970) condition for a market
breakdown in which only the worse-quality goods are traded. When this condition is not
met, the JHG allocation satises Q1 > 0 and at least one seller can protably destabilize
this allocation by exploiting the buyer's ability to engage in multiple trades.
To clarify this point, consider a candidate equilibrium in which the aggregate trades for
the buyer are described by a JHG allocation satisfying Q1 > 0. Each seller then earns zero
expected prot. A Bertrand-like argument shows that no seller is indispensable to provide
the rst layer Q1 at unit price v. That is, the aggregate trade (Q

1; T

1 ) remains available if
any seller unilaterally withdraws his menu oer. This observation, along with the fact that
type 1 subsidizes type 2 at (Q1; T

1 ), implies that any seller who is actively trading with type
1 has a protable menu deviation consisting of two nonzero contracts. The rst contract,
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targeted at type 1, is approximatively the same as the one the seller trades with type 1 on
the candidate equilibrium path, and makes a prot when traded by type 1 only. The second
contract, targeted at type 2, allows the buyer to purchase the second layer Q2 Q1 at a unit
price slightly less than v2, and makes a small loss when traded by type 2. Because the seller
now oers the second layer at slightly better terms than his competitors, it is optimal for
type 2 to trade it with him on top of the rst layer Q1 provided by the other sellers at unit
price v. By deviating in this way, the seller almost neutralizes his loss with type 2, while
securing a prot with type 1. This amounts to dumping bad risks on one's competitors by
selling complementary coverage to type 2 slightly below the fair premium rate, and basic
coverage to type 1 signicantly above the fair premium rate.
4.2 The Single-Contract Game
The above argument is very general and only relies on the sellers' ability to cross-subsidize
between dierent contracts at the deviation stage. Yet, as pointed out in the Introduction,
we do in practice observe insurance markets in which multiple contracting is prevalent and
features the basic- versus complementary-coverage distinction. The nonexclusive benchmark
thus does not seem to provide an adequate description of their working. Nevertheless, an
important lesson to be drawn is that cross-subsidies between contracts must somehow be
prevented for these markets to run eciently. As a matter of fact, these markets are subject
to regulation, a key aspect of which is the redistribution of costs between insurers providing
basic coverage. In the light of our analysis, this can be interpreted as a way to prevent
insurers from dumping bad risks on their competitors so as to boost the prots they make
on good risks.
To capture in a parsimonious way the need to prevent cross-subsidies between contracts
at the rm level, we follow Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), Wilson (1977), and Hellwig (1987)
in assuming that each seller oers at most one contract. The timing of the corresponding
single-contract game is as follows:
1. Each seller k 2 f1; : : : ; ng oers a contract (qk; tk) 2 R+  R.
2. After privately learning her type, the buyer selects which contracts to trade with the
sellers, if any.
Given a vector of contract oers ((q1; t1); : : : ; (qn; tn)), type i's problem is then
max
(
Ui
 X
k2K
qk;
X
k2K
tk
!
: K  f1; : : : ; ng
)
; (19)
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with
P
; = 0 by convention. We use perfect Bayesian equilibrium as our equilibrium concept.
Throughout the analysis, we focus on pure-strategy equilibria.
4.3 Equilibrium: Necessary Conditions
Our rst implementation result can be stated as follows.
Theorem 2 Any equilibrium of the single-contract game implements the JHG allocation.
In combination with Theorem 1, Theorem 2 provides a version of the First Welfare
Theorem for our economy: if the single-contract game has an equilibrium, this equilibrium
implements the unique robustly incentive-compatible allocation.
Remark The characterization provided in Theorem 2 diers from the earlier contributions
of Jaynes (1978), Hellwig (1988), and Glosten (1994) in three crucial ways. First, sellers
in our trading game cannot exchange information about the buyer. This contrasts with
Jaynes (1978) and Hellwig (1988), in which such communication is explicitly allowed for and
indeed plays a key role in the characterization of equilibrium. Second, sellers in our trading
game cannot react to the oers of their competitors. This contrasts with Hellwig (1988),
who considers a specic sequential timing for the sellers' oers. Third, our analysis is fully
strategic. This contrasts with Glosten (1994), whose analysis is entirely based on free-entry
arguments.
A direct implication of Theorem 2 is that any equilibrium of the single-contract game
involves zero expected prot for the sellers. An easy corollary is that any traded contract is
issued at unit price v or v2: that is, each active seller either provides basic coverage to both
types at the average premium rate, or complementary coverage to type 2 only at the fair
premium rate.
An important insight of our analysis is that, as in standard Bertrand competition, no
seller is indispensable in providing types 1 and 2 with their equilibrium utilities: otherwise,
he could earn a strictly positive expected prot by slightly increasing his price. Specically,
we show in Appendix A that, if any seller withdraws his contract oer, type 1 can still trade
(Q1; T

1 ), while type 2 can still obtain her equilibrium utility by purchasing an amount of
coverage at least equal to Q2. Thus any equilibrium of the single-contract game features free
entry, in the sense that at least one seller is inactive on the equilibrium path.
To examine the implications of this dispensability property, and to focus on the most
relevant scenario for applications, we hereafter restrict attention to the case where the two
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layers Q1 and Q

2   Q1 are positive. That is, the JHG allocation is such that both types
are actively trading and there is no pooling. The following assumption on gains from trade
(GT) is accordingly maintained in the remainder of the analysis.
Assumption GT 1(0; 0) > v and 2(Q

1; vQ

1) > v2.
Assumption GT is implicit in the insurance models of Jaynes (1978) and Hellwig (1988).
In fact, in these models where the loss size is the same for both types, the second half of
Assumption GT automatically holds as the rst layer Q1 entails less than full coverage. The
same property is satised in the coinsurance example. In the case where the rst half of
Assumption GT does not hold, the JHG allocation is degenerate with (Q1; T

1 ) = (0; 0) and
is, as shown by Attar, Mariotti, and Salanie (2014), the unique equilibrium allocation of the
arbitrary-menu game.
Under Assumption GT, multiple contracting must take place in equilibrium. Indeed,
as any traded contract is issued at unit price v or v2, type 2 must buy the rst layer Q

1
from a rst group of sellers, and the second layer Q2   Q1 from a second group of sellers.
Interestingly, the existence of an equilibrium imposes additional restrictions on the relative
size of these layers. To see why, note from the dispensability property that, if Q1 > 0, the
sellers' aggregate supply at the relatively low price v must exceed Q1. This excess supply
has no value for type 1, as Q1 is her demand at price v. However, it could be attractive for
type 2, who may be interested in purchasing more basic coverage at the average premium
rate. A necessary condition for the existence of equilibrium is thus that type 2 be not willing
to exploit these additional trading opportunities. A second necessary condition is that it be
impossible for a deviating buyer to protably take advantage of them. These two conditions
can be formulated as follows.
Corollary 1 If the single-contract game has an equilibrium; then the JHG allocation satises
U2(Q

2; T

2 )  U2(2Q1; 2T 1 ); (20)
Q1 > Q

2  Q1: (21)
Conditions (20){(21) are most easily understood when only two sellers issue contracts at
unit price v. Because none of them is indispensable, they must each oer a contract equal
to type 1's equilibrium aggregate trade (Q1; T

1 ). Condition (20) then simply expresses that
type 2 is not willing to trade (Q1; T

1 ) twice on the equilibrium path. Consider now what
happens if condition (21) does not hold. Then some other seller can attract type 2 by oering
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her to purchase an amount of coverage Q2  2Q1 at a unit price slightly above v2.19 Indeed,
combined with the trade (2Q1; 2T

1 ) made available by the two sellers issuing contracts at
unit price v, this oer allows type 2 to pay less than T 2 for her equilibrium coverage Q

2.
As this deviation is clearly protable, condition (21) must hold for an equilibrium to exist.
This logic easily extends when more than two sellers issue contracts at unit price v.
Geometrically, conditions (20){(21) hold when the aggregate trade (2Q1; 2T

1 ) is located
in the lower contour set of (Q2; T

2 ) for type 2, to the right of (Q

2; T

2 ), as illustrated in
Figure 2. This requires that the second layer Q2   Q1 that type 2 wants to trade at unit
price v2 be suciently small relative to the rst layer Q

1 that both types want to trade at
unit price v. In the Rothschild{Stiglitz economy or in the coinsurance example, this is the
case whenever the loss distributions of type 1 and type 2 are not too dierent. The testable
implications of these conditions are discussed at greater length in Section 4.5.
4.4 Equilibrium: Sucient Conditions
Theorem 2 singles out the JHG allocation as the unique candidate equilibrium allocation of
the single-contract game. We now investigate how to construct an equilibrium that indeed
implements this allocation. It is throughout assumed that Assumption GT is satised, as
well as the necessary conditions (20){(21).
We pointed out in Section 3.4.3 that, in these circumstances, cream skimming is possible
if the only feasible trades are (Q1; T

1 ) and (Q

2; T

2 ). This more generally holds if all contracts
are issued at unit price v or v2. As this holds for all traded contracts in any equilibrium of
the single-contract game, these contracts must be complemented by latent contracts. Our
goal in this section is to characterize a single latent contract that allows for a minimal
implementation of the JHG allocation. The characterizing property is as follows.
Denition 4 A contract (q`; t`) deters cream skimming if; for any contract (q; t);
U1(q; t)  U1(Q1; T 1 ) implies U2(q + q`; t+ t`)  U2(Q2; T 2 ): (22)
That is, any contract (q; t) that attracts type 1 also attracts type 2 in combination with
(q`; t`) when the latter contract is oered by some other seller. Then (q; t) cannot be a
protable deviation, as it must have a unit price at most equal to v to attract type 1.
Geometrically, (22) states that the translate of the upper contour set of (Q1; T

1 ) for type 1
19 Note that Q2 6= 2Q1 if an equilibrium exists. Otherwise, 2T 1 = 2vQ1 < vQ1 + v2(Q2  Q1) = T 2 and
type 2 is better o trading (2Q1; 2T

1 ) instead of (Q

2; T

2 ).
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along the vector (q`; t`) lies in the upper contour set of (Q2; T

2 ) for type 2. Our rst result
shows that there is a single candidate for (q`; t`), characterized by
U2(Q

1 + q
`; T 1 + t
`) = U2(Q

2; T

2 ); (23)
2(Q

1 + q
`; T 1 + t
`) = v: (24)
Specically, the following result holds.
Lemma 1 The contract (q`; t`) characterized by (23){(24) is; among the contracts issued
but not traded in equilibrium; the only one susceptible to deter cream skimming.
We now provide a sucient condition for (22), stated in terms of the Gaussian curvatures
i  1k@Uik3
  @2Ui @Ui @U>i 0

of type 1's and type 2's indierence curves (Debreu (1972)).
Assumption C If 1(Q1; T1) = 2(Q2; T2); then 1(Q1; T1) > 2(Q2; T2).
Assumption C can also be phrased in terms of the Hicksian demand functions Hi(p;u) 
minfpQ   T : Ui(Q; T )  ug associated to each type's preferences. Indeed, it is equivalent
to the property that H2(p;u2)   H1(p;u1) is strictly decreasing in p for all u1 and u2;
that is, type 2's Hicksian demand is more sensitive than type 1's to changes in the price
of insurance, whatever utility levels are used as references. This occurs whenever type 2's
indierence curves are atter than type 1's, once these curves are translated so as to make
them tangent at the point under study.20
The following result then holds.
Lemma 2 If the buyer's preferences satisfy Assumption C; the contract (q`; t`) characterized
by (23){(24) deters cream skimming.
Given the role it plays in our construction, it is natural to ask how restrictive Assumption
C is. A limiting case arises in the Rothschild{Stiglitz economy if the utility function in (2)
has constant absolute risk aversion, so that the buyer's Hicksian and Marshallian demand
functions coincide.21 One can check that any pair of indierence curves for types 1 and
2 are then translates of each other, which implies that the contract (q`; t`) deters cream
20Observe the dierence with the single-crossing condition, which does not allow for translations.
21Einav, Finkelstein, and Cullen (2010) similarly abstract from income eects in their estimation of the
welfare cost of adverse selection.
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skimming.22 More generally, Assumption C is satised if type 1 is uniformly more risk-
averse than type 2 in the sense of Aumann and Serrano (2008). This, however, creates a
tension with Assumption SC, which requires that type 2 be more eager to buy insurance
than type 1. If each type i has constant absolute risk aversion i, these assumptions are
jointly satised if
0 > 2   1 > 1
L
ln

(1  v2)=v2
(1  v1)=v1

;
that is, type 2 is less risk-averse but suciently riskier than type 1. We are now ready to
state our minimal-implementation result.
Theorem 3 Suppose the buyer's preferences satisfy Assumptions GT and C; as well as
conditions (20){(21). Then; if there are suciently many sellers; the single-contract game
has an equilibrium.
Our equilibrium construction relies on three contracts: a basic-coverage contract, (Q1; T

1 ),
a complementary-coverage contract, (Q2 Q1; T 2  T 1 ), and the latent contract (q`; t`). The
requirement that there be suciently many sellers reects that no seller can be indispensable
in oering basic or complementary coverage, and that a large enough number of copies of
the latent contract must be available.
In combination with Theorems 1{2, Theorem 3 provides a version of the Second Welfare
Theorem for our economy: under additional conditions on the buyer's preferences, the single-
contract game has an equilibrium, and this equilibrium implements the unique robustly
incentive-compatible allocation.
4.5 Testable Implications of Equilibrium
Taking into account multiple contracting yields new testable implications, compared to those
of the exclusive-contracting benchmark. The key dierence is that in the latter case, whether
data are collected from consumer surveys or from the trade records of a single insurer makes
no dierence, because each consumer's demand for coverage must be met by a single contract,
sold by a single insurer. However, when multiple contracting is allowed, the second approach
yields strikingly dierent results, as we now argue.
Since Chiappori and Salanie (2000), many empirical studies have tested the validity of
the positive-correlation property, which states that, under adverse selection, there should be
22The same property of indierence curves is satised when the buyer's preferences have the quadratic
representation (4).
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a positive correlation between the coverage purchased by a consumer and her risk. Due to
the single-crossing assumption, this property still holds in our setting when one considers
the aggregate coverage bought by a consumer: indeed, riskier consumers are also those that
are more eager to buy more insurance.23 The Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model also
yields the prediction that, in a separating equilibrium, the unit price of coverage should be
increasing, as each consumer pays the fair price, v1 or v2, associated to his type. Under
multiple contracting, this property also holds for the JHG allocation, though in a less clear-
cut manner. Indeed, the unit price paid by the low-risk consumer is v, while the unit price
paid by the high-risk consumer lies between v and v2, so that the dierence is bound to be
lower than v2   v1. In other words, multiple contracting reduces the convexity of the tari
for aggregate coverage, as observed on consumer surveys.
However most studies do not rely on consumer surveys, which are often imprecise and
limited in size, but instead use records from a subset of insurance companies. We now
examine what dierence this makes under multiple contracting, based on our analysis of the
single-contract game. Recall that our equilibrium construction relies on the basic-coverage
contract (Q1; T

1 ), with unit price v, the complementary-coverage contract (Q

2 Q1; T 2 T 1 ),
with unit price v2, and the latent contract (q
`; t`). Now, under conditions (20){(21), which
are necessary for an equilibrium to exist, the following inequalities hold:
Q1 > q
` > Q2  Q1 and
T 1
Q1
<
t`
q`
<
T 2   T 1
Q2  Q1
:
That is, contracts that oer higher amounts of coverage have a lower unit price. Therefore,
a testable implication of equilibrium is that, although consumers end up paying quantity
premia for their aggregate coverage, the individual contracts oered by insurers exhibit
quantity discounts.
This striking result stands in stark contrast with the natural intuition that allowing
for multiple contracting should push consumers towards splitting their demands between
insurers.24 The reason why, in our competitive setting, insurers end up proposing quantity
discounts is that the basic layer of coverage must be larger than the complementary one
to prevent high-risk consumers from trading several basic policies with dierent insurers.25
Each consumer then nds in her own interest to concentrate her trades on a minimum
23Chiappori, Jullien, Salanie and Salanie (2006) show that this property, and similar ones, can also be
derived in much more general settings from a simple inequality on equilibrium prots, even when single
crossing is not postulated.
24See, for instance, Chiappori (2000) for an articulation of this view.
25This explanation for quantity discounts diers from that proposed by Biais, Martimort, and Rochet
(2000) and Chade and Schlee (2012) when they study the case of a monopolistic insurer as in Stiglitz (1977).
In both papers, the shape of the hazard rate of the distribution of types plays an essential role.
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number of contracts. The key is that insurers together only oer a few contracts, which the
consumer can combine. Low-risk consumers then end up trading a single contract, while
high-risk consumers end up trading two dierent contracts.
This contrast, under multiple contracting, between the implications of equilibrium for the
demand and supply sides of the market is also relevant for the positive-correlation property.
Indeed, a novel testable implication of equilibrium is that, with data originating from a single
insurer, one should now observe a negative correlation between risk and coverage, because the
relatively small complementary layer of coverage is only purchased by high-risk consumers.
Finally, a robust prediction of our analysis is that, conditionally on buying basic coverage, a
consumer should on average appear as riskier if she also buys further coverage from another
insurer: consumers holding more than one insurance policy are on average more likely to
experience a greater level of loss.
These observations are useful when considering the empirical evidence, as exemplied by
the work of Cawley and Philipson (1999) on life insurance or that of Cardon and Hendel
(2001) on health insurance. Because the reference model in those papers is the exclusive-
competition model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), the distinction between demand- and
supply-side approaches stressed above is overlooked. As a result, the absence of quantity
premia or the failure of the positive-correlation property are interpreted as rejecting the
presence of adverse selection on life- and health-insurance markets. Yet, because multiple
contracting is allowed and even prevalent on these markets, one must be careful when testing
for the existence of quantity premia or for the positive-correlation property: in principle,
one would need to observe, for each consumer, her aggregate coverage and her aggregate
premium. In particular, checking only the contracts oered by insurers or the contracts sold
by a given insurer can be insucient and even misleading. A careful empirical analysis is
beyond the scope of the present paper, but it would certainly be worth proceeding to this
task while taking all precautions to ensure that data are comprehensive.26
5 Public Intervention
In this section, we discuss why, in the light of our analysis, public intervention in insurance
markets may be needed and which forms it can take. We then argue that our results are
more generally relevant for public intervention in nancial markets.
26At least one of the econometric treatments performed in Cawley and Philipson (1999) seems to escape
this criticism, as it is based on a consumer survey (AHEAD) that includes information on aggregate demand.
For a recent and positive test for adverse selection using the same data, see He (2009).
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5.1 Why Markets May Fail
Our implementation of the JHG allocation suggests that the observed prevalence of multiple
contracting in insurance markets can in principle be reconciled with the existence of adverse
selection. Yet competition under adverse selection may fail to lead to an equilibrium in a
relevant set of circumstances. First, the equilibrium construction provided in Section 4.4
crucially exploits the properties of a specic class of consumers' preferences. Second, and
more fundamentally, the necessary conditions for equilibrium derived in Section 4.3 impose
severe restrictions on each consumer type's willingness to trade. In particular, high-risk
consumers should nd it optimal to trade only a relatively small layer of complementary
coverage on top of the layer of basic coverage.
Overall, the impossibility to prevent consumers from simultaneously trading with several
insurers fundamentally alters the standard view of decentralization. On the one hand, as
discussed in Section 3.4, redistribution between dierent consumer types is made impossible:
the JHG allocation is the only budget-balanced allocation implementable by an entry-proof
tari. On the other hand, the market mechanism, based on competition among private
insurers, may fail to perform its allocative role. Thus public intervention may be needed to
implement the only allocation robust to competition from the private sector.
Theoretically, a straightforward way to implement the JHG allocation is for the state to
post the tari (15). The supply of public insurance then eectively dissuades any private
insurer from proposing additional trades. However, public intervention need not involve such
a complete crowding out of the private sector, and can instead help stabilize the market.
Indeed, as we now discuss, our multiple-contracting framework can accommodate several
forms of coexistence between public and private insurance. This may, in particular, shed
light on several existing health-insurance systems in which private coverage complements
public insurance.27
5.2 Mandatory Insurance
Dierent forms of mandatory health insurance, whereby consumers are not allowed to remain
uninsured, are in place in France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, and Switzerland. The
modalities of mandatory insurance vary from country to country. It can be publicly provided,
as in France; privately provided, as in Japan, Netherlands, or Switzerland; or consumers can
27In this context, private coverage is said to complement public insurance when it covers all or part of
the residual nonreimbursed costs in the form of copayment or cost sharing. We refer to the surveys of
Thomson and Mossialos (2009) and Thomson, Osborne, Squires, and Jun (2013) for institutional details and
cross-country evidence.
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have the choice to opt out from the public-insurance system to buy basic coverage designed
and priced by private insurers, as in Germany. Mandatory insurance can be complemented
by additional, privately-provided coverage, such as mutuelles in France.
In the context of our model, one can think of mandatory insurance as a situation in
which it is compulsory for each consumer to purchase the layer of basic coverage Q1 at price
T 1 , independently of any additional coverage that she may privately purchase. The contract
(Q1; T

1 ) can be provided by the state or by private insurers in a cost-eective way. Given
this obligation, private insurers then engage in Bertrand competition for complementary
insurance services.
In equilibrium, at least two insurers stand ready to sell any amount of complementary
coverage at the fair premium rate v2, allowing high-risk consumers to trade according to
the JHG allocation. Mandatory insurance acts as a threat against deviations and entry.
Indeed, to protably attract low-risk consumers, an insurer should issue a contract that, in
combination with (Q1; T

1 ), yields them at least utility U1(Q

1; T

1 ). In this case, however,
the deviating contract is also traded by high-risk consumers, who can complement it with
additional coverage provided by some other insurer. Equilibrium existence is thus restored
and the market fullls its allocative role: basic mandatory coverage is either provided by the
state or the private sector, while complementary coverage is provided by the private sector.28
5.3 Public Versus Private Insurance
Mandatory health insurance schemes require to identify and penalize both the consumers
who choose to remain uninsured, and the insurers who deny coverage to some consumers.
In practice, this raises the question of their enforceability.29 Moreover, allowing consumers
to opt out from the public-insurance system and turn instead to private insurers for basic
coverage, as in Germany, creates an incentive to cream skim low-risk consumers.30
Our analysis, however, suggests an alternative policy proposal that does not require
28The role of mandatory insurance under adverse selection has been so far only analyzed under exclusive
contracting. Mandatory insurance is evoked in Akerlof (1970), and has been the focus of much empirical
work (Finkelstein (2004), Einav, Finkelstein, and Cullen (2010), Einav and Finkelstein (2011)). Wilson
(1977), Dahlby (1981), and Crocker and Snow (1985a) show that making basic coverage mandatory and
simultaneously allowing private insurers to compete on an extended coverage allows one to reach a second-
best outcome. Villeneuve (2003) performs a similar analysis under nonexclusive contracting, but in a model
that assumes linear pricing.
29A key reference is provided by the recent discussion of the system of penalties associated to the Aordable
Care Act (see https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2015reports/201543030fr.pdf).
30In line with this point, Thomson, Osborne, Squires, and Jun (2013, page 57) note that \Especially for
young people with a good income, [...] [privately oered basic coverage] [...] is attractive, as the insurance
may oer contracts with more extensive ranges of services and lower premiums."
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such a legal requirement. Indeed, a less intrusive form of public intervention has the state
oering any amount of basic coverage up to Q1 at the average premium rate v. As any
private insurer is ready to sell any amount of coverage at the high premium rate v2, the
state together with any of them make available the entry-proof tari (15). Thus no private
insurer has an incentive to deviate and entry is impossible. The JHG allocation is thereby
implemented by a mix of public and private insurance, while letting consumers free to choose
their preferred level of coverage. This is reminiscent of the universal healthcare vouchers
advocated by Emanuel and Fuchs (2005, 2007), whereby universal coverage is provided,
while letting consumers free to purchase additional services or amenities.
Public intervention thus need not interfere with the choices of consumers, who can remain
sovereign in their decisions to purchase insurance. Neither are taxes or subsidies needed.31
This contrasts with policy recommendations from exclusive models of competitive insurance
markets under adverse selection: in our setting, competition is powerful enough to select
a unique equilibrium in which prices eciently reect costs|though this rule applies to
successive layers of insurance and not to the aggregate coverage bought by each type of
consumer.
5.4 Financial Markets
In the aftermath of the recent crisis, the design of public intervention under the threat
of adverse selection has become a central issue for the regulation of credit and interbank
markets. In particular, the opportunity for agents to opt out of a public program and trade
in private markets has been acknowledged as a key constraint for the design of nancial
institutions. In this respect, the recent works of Philippon and Skreta (2012) and Tirole
(2012) suggest a foundation for liquidity-injection programs that provide a credible signal to
uninformed lenders by rejuvenating the relevant markets. The logic underlying their results
can be summarized as follows. First, assuming that lenders and informed borrowers have
linear preferences over the traded assets, market equilibria in the absence of any intervention
feature the market unravelling originally described by Akerlof (1970). Second, assuming that
public and private liquidity are mutually exclusive, an optimal intervention consists in the
state attracting only the least protable borrowers, either through direct lending (Philippon
and Skreta (2012)), or by repurchasing low-quality assets (Tirole (2012)). By participating
in a bailout program, a borrower may however end up signalling her nancial weakness to
the market, crucially aecting her reputation. A large literature has analyzed the potentially
31See Crocker and Snow (1985b) for a study of taxes and subsidies under exclusive contracting.
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perverse implications of such a stigma eect.32
In modern nancial markets, however, borrowers' choices are not limited to opting out
of a public program or exclusively participating to it, because they have the opportunity
to complement such a program with additional funds raised on private markets. Focusing
on the US interbank market over the 2007{2010 period, Armantier, Ghysels, Sarkar, and
Shrader (2015) document how banks combine their loans at the Fed Discount Window with
additional funding raised on ABCP and Repo markets, which exhibit similar lending terms
with respect to eligibility, collateral and maturity.33 To the extent that these practices
create an eective threat for the state, our results oer novel insights for the design of
public intervention under adverse selection. In these contexts, as long as borrowers are risk-
averse, the absence of any intervention may imply the nonexistence of a market equilibrium.34
Thus, public intervention is not needed to unfreeze the market, but rather to guarantee its
functioning. To achieve this goal, a program must successfully discipline lenders' strategic
behavior, preventing them from engaging in dumping practices. This would require public
liquidity provision to involve a price suciently low, v, so as to attract the most protable
borrowers, corresponding to type-1 buyers in our model, and a borrowing limit Q1 such that
no overborrowing by the least protable ones is possible. Overall, such an intervention would
achieve budget balance, unlike those proposed by Philippon and Skreta (2012) and Tirole
(2012), and induce all types of borrowers to participate. This in turn would make it harder
to infer their individual nancial conditions, mitigating the impact of the stigma eect.
6 Conclusion
In modern economies, the insurance sector plays a key role by allowing agents to share risk.
Because those risks are often private information, the properties of equilibrium allocations,
and in fact the very existence of equilibrium, are still the subject of a lively debate among
academics. The absence of consensus on the justications and on the right design of public
intervention may also be related to the fact that dierent countries display strikingly dierent
regulatory systems for, in particular, health insurance. In this paper, we have proposed to
put multiple contracting at the center stage of the analysis. We have characterized a robustly
incentive-compatible allocation, and we have analyzed whether and how competition between
32See Gorton (2015) for a survey.
33Relatedly, Berger, Black, Bouwman, and Dlugosz (2016) show how, in the same period, the banks' relying
on both the Fed's Discount Window and Term Auction Facility liquidity programs signicantly increased
their aggregate lending.
34In the terminology of Hendren (2014), this is an instance of unravelling of market equilibrium.
32
private insurers allows to implement it. Our equilibrium construction opens a new and rich
avenue for empirical research. We also hope that our policy proposals may renew the existing
policy debates about health insurance, and more generally about the management of nancial
markets plagued by adverse selection.
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Online Appendix A: Proofs of the Main Results
Proof of Theorem 1. The only thing that remains to prove is that, given the tari T P
oered by the planner and the tari TE oered by the entrant, there exist a pair of solutions
(qP1 ; q
E
1 ) and (q
P
2 ; q
E
2 ) to (5) for i = 1; 2 such that q
E
2  qE1 . In line with Attar, Mariotti, and
Salanie (2015), notice that each type i evaluates any pair (qE; tE) she may trade with the
entrant through the indirect utility function
zi(q
E; tE)  maxfUi(qP + qE; T P (qP ) + tE) : qP  0g: (25)
Observe that the maximum in (25) is always attained and that, if (qPi ; q
E
i ) is a solution to
(5), then qEi maximizes zi(q
E; TE(qE)) with respect to qE. As shown in Attar, Mariotti, and
Salanie (2015), the convexity of the tari T P and Assumption SC together imply that the
functions zi satisfy the following single-crossing property: for all q
E  qE; tE; and tE;
z1(q
E; tE) < z1(q
E; tE) implies z2(q
E; tE) < z2(q
E; tE): (26)
We then obtain the desired result by a standard monotone-comparative-statics argument:
indeed, suppose, by way of contradiction, that qE2 < q
E
1 at any pair of solutions (q
P
1 ; q
E
1 ) and
(qP2 ; q
E
2 ) to (5) for i = 1; 2. Therefore, at any such pair, z1(q
E
2 ; T
E(qE2 )) < z1(q
E
1 ; T
E(qE1 )), so
that, according to (26), z2(q
E
2 ; T
E(qE2 )) < z2(q
E
1 ; T
E(qE1 )). But then, according to the above
observation, trading qE2 with the entrant cannot be part of a solution to (5) for type 2, a
contradiction. Hence the result. 
Proof of Theorem 2. Suppose an equilibrium exists, and let ((Q1; T1); (Q2; T2)) be the
equilibrium allocation. On the equilibrium path, we can partition the set of sellers into K;;,
the subset of sellers who trade with neither type 1 nor type 2, K1;, the subset of sellers
who trade with type 1 only, K;2, the subset of sellers who trade with type 2 only, and K12,
the subset of sellers who trade with both type 1 and type 2. If the subset K;; of inactive
sellers is nonempty, then any such seller can behave as an entrant, and the rst step of
the proof of Theorem 1 implies that the equilibrium allocation ((Q1; T1); (Q2; T2)) coincides
with the JHG allocation ((Q1; T

1 ); (Q

2; T

2 )). The bulk of the argument consists in showing
that any candidate equilibrium in which K;; is empty and hence all sellers are active also
implements the JHG allocation. We later show that this property actually implies that such
an equilibrium cannot exist, and thus that any equilibrium involves some inactive sellers.
The proof consists of three steps.
Step 1 Suppose rst that, in the candidate equilibrium under consideration, K1; is empty
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and there are at least two sellers in K12. Then the buyer's aggregate trade (Q12; T12) with
the sellers in K12 coincides with (Q1; T1). Now, each seller k 2 K12 can claim the aggregate
expected prot T1   vQ1 by deviating to (Q1; T1   "), for some positive and small enough
". But then, denoting by bk seller k's equilibrium expected prot, it follows that bk 
T1  vQ1 =
P
k02K12 b
k0 for all k 2 K12, so that any seller k 2 K12 earns zero expected prot,
bk = tk   vqk = 0, and T1 = vQ1.
This observation implies that, in analogy with (11),
U1(Q1; T1)  maxfU1(Q; vQ) : Q  0g: (27)
Otherwise, any seller in K12 can deviate to (Q

1; vQ

1 + "), for some positive and small
enough ", a contract that attracts type 1 and is protable even if it also attracts type 2, a
contradiction. Hence (27) holds. Additionally, we have T1 = vQ1, so that (27) holds with
equality. This uniquely pins down Q1, which must coincide with Q

1 by (7).
Now, because Q1 is the demand of type 1 at price v and the sellers in K12 trade (Q

1; vQ

1)
in the aggregate, any seller k 2 K12 is indispensable for type 1 to reach her equilibrium utility.
Indeed, if some seller k 2 K12 withdraws his contract oer (qk; vqk), type 1 can only trade
with the other sellers in K12, who sell at unit price v but whose aggregate supply is strictly
less than Q1, or with the sellers in K2, who sell at a unit price no less than v2 > v. Therefore,
if seller k deviates to (qk; vqk+"), for some positive and small enough ", he still attracts type
1. Yet this contract is protable even if it also attracts type 2, a contradiction. This shows
that, in any candidate equilibrium in which all sellers are active, one cannot simultaneously
have K1; empty and at least two sellers in K12.
Step 2 A direct implication of Step 1 is thatK;2 is nonempty in any candidate equilibrium
in which all sellers are active. Otherwise Q2 = Q12, which, as Q2  Q1 by Assumption SC
and Q1  Q12 by construction, implies that Q1 = Q2 = Q12; but then all sellers belong to
K12, which contradicts Step 1. We now discuss the possible cases for K;2, starting in this
step with the case in which it contains a single seller k.
In this case, seller k behaves as a monopolist for the layer Q2   Q12. In particular, he
cannot increase tk, so that the sellers other than k must oer some aggregate trade (Q k; T k)
such that U2(Q
 k; T k) = U2(Q2; T2). As these sellers are exactly those who sell to type 1,
one must have Q k  Q1. Moreover, Assumption SC applied to the case where the buyer
only faces the sellers other than k implies that one must have Q k  Q1. It follows that
Q k = Q1  Q2 and thus that U2(Q1; T1) = U2(Q2; T2).
We next prove that Q2 > Q1 > Q12. The proof is by contradiction, starting from the
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observation that Q2  Q1  Q12. First, if Q1 = Q2, then the layer Q1   Q12 = Q2   Q12
is traded both by seller(s) in K1; and by the single seller k in K;2, so that one must have
T1 = T2. But then seller k can slightly reduce t
k in order to protably attract both types,
a contradiction. Hence Q2 > Q1. Second, if Q12 = Q1, then K1; is empty. However, by
assumption, all n  3 sellers are active and there is a single seller in K;2. Thus there must
be at least two sellers in K12 if K1; is empty, which contradicts Step 1. Hence, overall,
Q2 > Q1 > Q12, as claimed.
It follows from this observation that the single seller k in K;2 can, instead of oering
(Q2   Q12; T2   T12), deviate to (Q2   Q1; T2   T1   "), for some positive ". This contract
attracts type 2, along with the contracts proposed by the sellers in K1; [ K12. Hence one
must have, letting " go to zero,
T2   T12   v2(Q2  Q12)  T2   T1   v2(Q2  Q1)
or, equivalently,
T1   T12  v2(Q1  Q12): (28)
Thus sellers in K1; sell at a unit price at least equal to v2. This, in turn, implies that K12 is
empty. Otherwise, any seller in k0 2 K12 can deviate to (qk0 +Q1  Q12; tk0 + T1   T12   "),
for some positive ". This contract attracts type 1, along with the contracts proposed by the
sellers in K12 other than k
0. Moreover, because U2(Q2; T2) = U2(Q1; T1), it also attracts type
2, along with the same contracts. As the layer Q1 Q12 is sold at a unit price at least equal
to v2, this deviation is protable for " small enough, a contradiction. Hence K12 is empty,
as claimed.
Because, by assumption, all n  3 sellers are active and there is a single seller in K;2,
and because, as just shown, K12 is empty, there must be at least two sellers in K1;. Any
such seller can deviate to (Q1; T1   "), for some positive ", thus attracting both types as
U2(Q2; T2) = U2(Q1; T1). Therefore, one must have, for each k
0 2 K1;,
m1(t
k0   v1qk0)  T1   vQ1:
Summing over k0 2 K1 yields
m1(T1   v1Q1)  jK1j(T1   vQ1)
or, equivalently,
0  (jK1j   1)(T1   vQ1) +m2(T1   v2Q1):
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But, as jK1j  2 and T1  v2Q1 by (28) along with the fact that K12 is empty, the rst
term on the right-hand side of this inequality is strictly positive and the second term is
nonnegative, a contradiction. Hence there exists no equilibrium in which all sellers are
active and K;2 contains a single seller.
Step 3 Suppose nally that there are at least two sellers inK;2. These sellers can undercut
each other to attract type 2, so that they earn zero prot. Hence any of them can behave
as an entrant to attract type 1, from which (27) follows. Moreover, in analogy with (9),
U2(Q2; T2)  maxfU2(Q1 +Q; T1 + v2Q) : Q  0g: (29)
Otherwise, letting Q be the solution to the problem on the right-hand side of (29), any seller
in K;2 can deviate to (Q; v2Q + "), for some positive and small enough ", a contract that
attracts type 1 and is protable even if it also attracts type 2, a contradiction. Thus both
(27) and (29) hold, and one can conclude as in the proof of Theorem 1 that the equilibrium
allocation coincides with the JHG allocation. Hence the result.
We provide below additional properties that are satised by any equilibrium, and that
are mentioned in the discussion of Theorem 2.
First, because the equilibrium allocation coincides with the JHG allocation, which makes
zero expected prot, each seller earns zero expected prot in equilibrium. Hence the sellers
in K12 sell at unit price v and the sellers in K;2 sell at unit price v2. If there are some sellers
in K1;, then they must sell at unit price v1. But, as the coverage Q1 for type 1 is jointly
provided at unit price v by the sellers in K1;[K12, it follows that K1; is empty. As a result,
any traded contract is issued at unit price v or v2. Hence, in any equilibrium, the situation
is the following:
1. If Q1 > 0, then sellers in K12 together supply Q

1 at unit price v. None of these sellers can
be indispensable for type 1 to reach her equilibrium utility, as characterized by (7). Therefore,
for each k 2 K12, the sellers other than k must oer some aggregate trade (Q k; T k) such
that U1(Q
 k; T k) = U1(Q1; T

1 ). We prove below that Q
 k = Q1.
35 Thus, if any seller in
K12 withdraws his contract oer, type 1 can still trade (Q

1; T

1 ). As the other active sellers
cannot together propose (Q1; T

1 ), this shows that K;; is nonempty: any equilibrium involves
inactive players and thus features free entry.
To prove the claim, suppose, by way of contradiction, that Q k 6= Q1. Then, from (7){(8)
and the strict quasiconcavity of U1, one must have T
 k T 1 < v(Q k Q1) or, equivalently,
35A similar proof of this claim appears in Attar, Mariotti, and Salanie (2014).
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T k < vQ k. We distinguish three cases.
(i) If Q k < Q1, then seller k can deviate to (Q

1  Q k; T 1   T k   "), for some positive
and small enough ". This contract attracts type 1 along with the aggregate trade
(Q k; T k) and, because T k   T 1 < v(Q k   Q1), it is protable even if it also
attracts type 2, a contradiction.
(ii) If Q1 < Q
 k < Q2, then seller k can deviate to (Q

2   Q k; T 2   T k   "), for some
positive and small enough ". This contract attracts type 2 along with the aggregate
trade (Q k; T k) and, because
T 2   T k   v2(Q2  Q k) > T 2   v2Q2 + (v2   v)Q k = (v2   v)(Q k  Q1) > 0;
it is protable even if it does not attract type 1, a contradiction.
(iii) Suppose nally that Q k  Q2. Because type 2 is not attracted by (Q k; T k), one
must have U2(Q
 k; T k)  U2(Q2; T 2 ), and because T k < vQ k, one must have
Q k > Q2. By Assumption SC, we get that U1(Q
 k; T k) < U1(Q2; T

2 ), which, as
U1(Q

2; T

2 )  U1(Q1; T 1 ) by revealed preference on the equilibrium path, contradicts
the assumption that U1(Q
 k; T k) = U1(Q1; T

1 ).
This proves that Q k = Q1, as claimed. Note that the reasoning in (i) more generally shows
that no contract (qk
0
; tk
0
) such that qk
0  Q1 and tk0 < vqk0 can be issued in equilibrium.
Thus (Q1; T

1 ) can only be obtained through contracts with unit price v.
2. If Q2 > Q

1, then sellers in K;2 together supply Q

2  Q1 at unit price v2. None of these
sellers can be indispensable for type 2 to reach her equilibrium utility, as characterized by
(9). Therefore, for each k 2 K;2, the sellers other than k must oer some aggregate trade
(Q k; T k) such that U2(Q k; T k) = U2(Q2; T

2 ). We prove below that Q
 k  Q2. Notice
that, unlike for type 1, the equilibrium aggregate trade (Q2; T

2 ) of type 2 need not remain
available if any of the sellers who trade with her withdraws his contract oer.36 As the other
active sellers' together supply less than Q2, this shows again that K;; is nonempty.
To prove the claim, suppose, by way of contradiction, that Q k < Q2. Then, from (9){
(10) and the strict quasiconcavity of U2, one must have T
 k   T 2 < v2(Q k   Q2). Then
seller k can deviate to (Q2 Q k; T 2  T k  "), for some positive and small enough ". This
contract attracts type 2 along with the aggregate trade (Q k; T k) and is protable even if
it does not attract type 1, a contradiction. 
36In Attar, Mariotti, and Salanie (2014), this property was satised because trades of negative quantities
were allowed, which is not the case in our setting.
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Proof of Corollary 1. Fix an equilibrium of the single-contract game, assuming that such
an equilibrium exists. Let Kv be the set of sellers issuing contracts at unit price v and, for
each k 2 Kv, let k  qk=Q1. Fix some k 2 Kv \K12, so that, in particular, 0 < k  1.
Because, as shown in the proof of Theorem 2, type 1 can still trade (Q1; T

1 ) if any seller in
K12 withdraws his contract oer, and no contract (q
k0 ; tk
0
) such that qk
0  Q1 and tk0 < vtk0
can be issued in equilibrium, there must exist K kv  Kv n fkg such that
P
k02K kv 
k0 = 1.
Therefore, we have
1 <
X
k02K kv
k
0
+ k = 1 + k  2:
Note that the aggregate trade ((1+k)Q1; v(1+
k)Q1) is available on the equilibrium path,
so that
U2(Q

2; T

2 )  U2((1 + k)Q1; (1 + k)vQ1): (30)
Moreover, because some sellers trade contracts with unit price v2, there exists some seller
k00 62 K kv [ fkg. To conclude the proof, we only need to show that
(1 + k)Q1 > Q

2: (31)
Indeed, along with (30), (31) implies that 2Q1 > Q

2, which is (21), and, in turn, that
U2(Q

2; T

2 )  U2(2Q1; 2vQ1), which is (20). To establish (31), observe rst that, because
T 2 > vQ

2, (1+
k)Q1 6= Q2. Let us suppose, by way of contradiction, that (1+k)Q1 < Q2.
Then any seller k00 62 fkg [K kv can deviate to (Q2  (1 + k)Q1; T 2   v(1 + k)Q1  "), for
some positive and small enough ". This contract attracts type 2 along with the aggregate
trade ((1 + k)Q1; (1 + 
k)vQ1) and, because
T 2   v(1 + k)Q1   v2[Q2   (1 + k)Q1] > T 2   v2Q2 + (v2   v)(1 + k)Q1
= (v2   v)kQ1
> 0;
it is protable even if it does not attract type 1, a contradiction. Hence the result. 
Proof of Lemma 1. If a contract (q`; t`) deters cream skimming, then, by (22) applied to
(q; t) = (Q1; T

1 ), we have U2(Q

1 + q
`; T 1 + t
`)  U2(Q2; T 2 ). But this inequality cannot be
strict if the contract (q`; t`) is issued but not traded in equilibrium, because, otherwise, type
2 would be better o trading it on top of type 1's aggregate trade (Q1; T

1 ). Hence (23).
Next, by (22), the translate of the upper contour set of (Q1; T

1 ) for type 1 along the vector
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(q`; t`) lies in the upper contour set of (Q2; T

2 ) for type 2. As these two sets intersect at
(Q1 + q
`; T 1 + t
`) by (23), we obtain along the lines of Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979,
Lemma 1) that the slope of type 2's equilibrium indierence curve at (Q1+ q
`; T 1 + t
`) must
equal the slope of type 1's equilibrium indierence curve at (Q1; T

1 ), that is, v. Hence (24).
The result follows.
For future reference, note that Assumption GT and condition (20) ensure the existence
and uniqueness of the contract (q`; t`) and also imply Q1 > q
`. Moreover, because the slope
of type 2's equilibrium indierence curve is higher at (Q2; T

2 ) than at (Q

1+ q
`; T 1 + t
`), one
must have q` > Q2  Q1. The unit price t`=q` is therefore above v and below v2. 
Proof of Lemma 2. We shall hereafter slightly abuse notation by indentifying each type's
equilibrium indierence curve with its functional expression T = Ii (Q). Recalling that
I2 (Q1 + q`) = I1 (Q1) + t`, we only need to prove that the translate of I1 along the vector
(q`; t`) lies below I2 . For this, it is enough to show that
@I1 (Q) ? @I2 (Q+ q`) if Q 7 Q1:
A sucient condition for this is the following single-crossing property:
@I1 (Q) = @I2 (Q+ q`) implies @2I1 (Q) < @2I2 (Q+ q`):
which, under Assumption C, is a direct implication of the identities
i = @Ii ;
i =   @
2Ii
[1 + (@Ii )2]3=2
:
The result follows. 
Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose that two sellers oer the contract c  (Q1; T 1 ), two sellers
oer the contract c0  (Q2   Q1; T 2   T 1 ), and suciently many sellers oer the contract
c`  (q`; t`) characterized by (23){(24). We derive below a bound for this number beyond
which existence of an equilibrium is guaranteed. The proof consists of three steps.
Step 1 The rst thing we have to check is that each buyer type chooses to trade according
to the JHG allocation, given the supply of contracts just dened. Consider rst type 1.
Because 1(c1) = v, c is her most preferred contract with unit price v. As all oered contracts
have unit prices at least equal to v, trading a single contract c is thus optimal for type 1.
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Consider next type 2. Because 2(c + c
0) = v2, and the unit price v2 of c0 is strictly higher
than the unit price v of c, she is strictly worse o trading only contracts c0 than trading
a contract c along with a contract c0. Thus type 2 optimally trades at least one contract
c. Moreover, if she trades exactly one contract c, it is optimal for her to trade in addition
exactly one contract c0. To prove that she cannot be strictly better o trading c twice, note
that, because, by (20){(21), 2c is located in the lower contour set of c+ c0 for type 2, to the
right of the line with slope v2 going through c+ c
0, and because 2(c+ c0) = v2, 2(2c) must
be lower than the unit price v2 of c
0. This, together with (20), implies that trading c twice,
possibly along with one or two contracts c0, cannot yield type 2 a higher utility than trading
a contract c along with a contract c0. Finally, as U2(c+c`) = U2(c+c0), we only need to check
that, if type 2 trades c` once, the optimal thing for her to do is to combine this contract c`
with exactly one contract c. Indeed, because 2(c + c
`) = v, c is, among all contracts with
unit price v, the best that type 2 can combine with c`. As all oered contracts have unit
prices at least equal to v, trading a single contract c is, therefore, the unique optimal choice
for type 2 once she has traded c`. Thus, given the contracts oered, each buyer type chooses
to trade according to the JHG allocation, as claimed.
Step 2 We next check that any deviation that attracts type 2 is unprotable.
First, we show that there is no protable deviation for a seller that attracts both types.
Indeed, to be protable, the corresponding contract ~c would need to have a unit price strictly
higher than v. However, recall that 1(c) = v and that all oered contracts have unit prices
at least equal to v. Trading ~c would then yield type 1 a strictly lower utility than trading a
single contract c, which remains feasible following any seller's unilateral deviation. Such a
deviation is thus not possible.
Second, we show that there is no protable deviation for a seller that only attracts type
2. Indeed, to be protable, the corresponding contract ~c would need to have a unit price
strictly higher than v2. However, recall that 2(c+c
0) = v2 and that, as shown in Step 1, type
2 cannot gain from combining any contract with unit price strictly higher than v2 with 2c.
Trading ~c, possibly along with some contracts c or c0, would then yield type 2 a strictly lower
utility than trading a contract c along with a contract c0, which remains feasible following
any seller's unilateral deviation. The possibility remains that type 2 combines c` with ~c.
However, as all oered contracts have unit prices at least equal to v, and strictly so for ~c,
trading a single contract c is the unique optimal choice for type 2 once she has traded c`, as
shown in Step 1. Such a deviation is thus not possible.
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Step 3 We nally derive an upper bound on the required number of sellers oering the
contract c`, which in turn gives us a bound for the number of sellers beyond which existence
of an equilibrium is guaranteed. Specically, dene
A1  f(q; t) 2 R+  R : q  Q2 and vq  t  v1qg;
A2  fNc+N 0c0 : (N;N 0) 2 f0; 1; 2g  f0; 1; 2gg;
A3  f(Q; T ) 2 R+  R : U1(Q; T )  U1(c)g:
To interpret A1, observe that if type 1 were attracted by a contract (q; t) with q  Q2
issued by a deviating seller, then this would mean that by trading (q; t), possibly along with
other available contracts, she could reach an aggregate trade (Q; T ) with Q  Q2, which
she would weakly prefer to the aggregate trade c + c0 that remains available following any
unilateral deviation. Because c+ c0 is the equilibrium aggregate trade of type 2 and involves
an aggregate coverage Q2, it would follow from Assumption SC that type 2 would strictly
prefer (Q; T ) to her equilibrium aggregate trade c+c0, and thus would be strictly attracted by
the contract (q; t). Therefore, we can safely restrict our quest for potential cream-skimming
deviation to the set of contracts (q; t) such that q  Q2. In addition, the contracts in A1
imply no loss for the sellers when only traded by type 1 and have a unit price lower than v, so
that they are potentially attractive for type 1, either per se or combined with other available
contracts. Next, A2 is the set of aggregate trades that can be made with four sellers, two
of whom oer the contract c and two of whom oer the contract c0. Last, A3 is the upper
contour set of c for type 1. Then
N `  maxfN 2 N : (A1 + A2 +Nc`) \ A3 6= ;g (32)
is the maximum number of contracts c` type 1 may ever want to trade, if she were oered
a contract in A1, which she could complement by aggregate trades in A2 and as many
contracts c` as she wishes. Because A1 is compact, c 2 A1 \ A3, (0; 0) 2 A2, and 1(c) = v
is strictly lower than v2 and the unit price of c
`, N ` is well dened and nite. Suppose now
that two sellers oer the contract c, two sellers oer the contract c0, and maxfN ` + 1; 2g
sellers oer the contract c`. Consider now a deviation that attracts type 1. Trading the
corresponding contract ~c, possibly along with contracts c, c0, and c`, must yield type 1 at
least her equilibrium utility. However, because the contract c` deters cream skimming under
Assumption C, type 2 could also weakly increase her utility by trading the same contracts
as type 1, plus one additional contract c`. The denition (32) of N ` ensures that type
1 will never trade more than N ` contracts c` following the deviation. If, as postulated,
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maxfN ` + 1; 2g sellers oer the contract c`, a contract c` remains available for type 2 to
trade even after mimicking type 1. As a result, one can construct the buyer's best response
in such a way that both types trade ~c with the deviating seller, which, as shown in Step 2,
cannot be protable for him. Overall, existence of an equilibrium is guaranteed as soon as
there are at least maxfN ` + 1; 2g+ 4 sellers. Hence the result. 
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Online Appendix B: Omitted Calculations
On Single Crossing and Coinsurance. We show that Assumption SC is satised if f2
dominates f1 in the monotone-likelihood-ratio order. We have, for all (Q; T ) and i,
i(Q; T ) =
R
Lu0(W0   (1 Q)L  T )fi(L) dLR
u0(W0   (1 Q)L  T )fi(L) dL =
Z
L dGi(L); (33)
where Gi is a distribution with density
gi(L) =
u0(W0   (1 Q)L  T )fi(L)R
u0(W0   (1 Q)L  T )fi(L) dL (34)
with respect to Lebesgue measure. If f2 dominates f1 in the monotone-likelihood-ratio order,
then, by (34), g2 also dominates g1 in the monotone-likelihood-ratio order, and soG2 a fortiori
rst-order stochastically dominates G1. It then follows from (33) that 2(Q; T ) > 1(Q; T ),
which is precisely Assumption SC. 
On Assumption C. We rst show that Assumption C is equivalent to the property that
H2(p;u2) H1(p;u1) is strictly decreasing in p for all u1 and u2. We shall hereafter slightly
abuse notation by identifying each type's indierence curve associated to utility level u with
its functional expression T = Ii(Q;u). The strict quasiconcavity of Ui implies that, for each
u, Ii(Q;u) is strictly concave with respect to Q. By construction, the slope of Ii(;u) is
type i's marginal rate of substitution,
@Ii
@Q
(Q;u) = i(Q; Ii(Q;u));
and @Ii=@Q is the inverse of the Hicksian demand function,
@Ii
@Q
(Q;u) = p if and only if Q = Hi(p;u):
Assumption C states that, if
@I1
@Q
(Q1;u1) =
@I2
@Q
(Q2;u2);
then
  (@
2I1=@Q2)(Q1;u1)
f1 + [(@I1=@Q)(Q1;u1)]2g 32
>   (@
2I2=@Q2)(Q2;u2)
f1 + [(@I2=@Q)(Q2;u2)]2g 32
;
so that
@2I1
@Q2
(Q1;u1) <
@2I2
@Q2
(Q2;u2):
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Call p  (@I1=@Q)(Q1;u1) = (@I2=@Q)(Q2;u2). Overall, Assumption C reduces to the
following condition:
@2I1
@Q2
 
@I1
@Q
(;u1)
 1
(p);u1
!
<
@2I2
@Q2
 
@I2
@Q
(;u2)
 1
(p);u2
!
;
that is, ((@I2=@Q)(;u2)) 1(p)   ((@I1=@Q)(;u1)) 1(p) is strictly decreasing in p, which is
precisely the desired property of Hicksian demand functions.
Next, assuming that type i's preferences are represented by
Ui(Q; T ) = viui(W0   L+Q  T ) + (1  vi)ui(W0   T );
we show that Assumption C is satised if type 1 is uniformly more risk-averse than type
2, that is, letting i(w)   u00i (w)=u0i(w) be type i's coecient of absolute risk aversion at
wealth w, if 1(w1) > 2(w2) for any wealth levels w1 and w2. We have
@Ii
@Q
(Q;u) = i(Q; Ii(Q;u))
=
1
1 + [(1  vi)=vi][u0i(W0   Ii(Q;u))=u0i(W0   L+Q  Ii(Q;u))]
and hence
@2Ii
@Q2
(Q;u) =  

@Ii
@Q
(Q;u)
2
1  vi
vi

B(Q;u)
[u0i(W0   L+Q  Ii(Q;u))]2
; (35)
where
B(Q;u)   u00i (W0   Ii(Q;u))
@Ii
@Q
(Q;u)u0i(W0   L+Q  Ii(Q;u))
 u0i(W0   Ii(Q;u))

1  @Ii
@Q
(Q;u)

u00i (W0   L+Q  Ii(Q;u)):
Simple manipulations show that
B(Q;u)
[u0i(W0   L+Q  Ii(Q;u))]2
=
u0i(W0   Ii(Q;u))
u0i(W0   L+Q  Ii(Q;u))
i(Q;u);
where
i(Q;u)  i(W0   Ii(Q;u)) @Ii
@Q
(Q;u) + i(W0   L+Q  Ii(Q;u))

1  @Ii
@Q
(Q;u)

:
Substituting in (35) and simplifying yields
@2Ii
@Q2
(Q;u) =   @Ii
@Q
(Q;u)

1  @Ii
@Q
(Q;u)

i(Q;u):
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These two equalities imply that, if type 1 is uniformly more risk-averse than type 2, we have
1(Q;u1) > 2(Q;u2) and thus (@
2I1=@Q2)(Q;u1) < (@2I2=@Q2)(Q;u2) for all u1 and u2
such that (@I1=@Q)(Q;u1) = (@I2=@Q)(Q;u2), which is precisely Assumption C. 
On the CARA Example. Preferences represented by (2) with u(x)    exp( x) can
alternatively be represented by
Ui(Q; T ) = ui(Q)  T (36)
with
ui(Q)    1

ln(vi exp( (W0   L+Q)) + (1  vi) exp( W0)):
Moreover, we have
@u2(Q+Q0) = @u1(Q) (37)
with
Q0  1

ln

(1  v1)=v1
(1  v2)=v2

> 0:
Hence type 1 may be thought of having the same preferences as type 2, while having already
purchased an amount of coverageQ0. Geometrically, properties (36){(37) imply that any pair
of indierence curves for types 1 and 2 are, over the relevant domain, oblique or horizontal
translates of each other. The translating vector is (q`; t`) and connects points of equal slopes
on these indierence curves.
When each type i has constant absolute risk aversion i, one has
ui(Q)    1
i
ln(vi exp( i(W0   L+Q)) + (1  vi) exp( iW0)):
A direct calculation yields the following expression for type i's demand function:
Hi(p) = max

L+
1
i
ln

(1  p)=p
(1  vi)=vi

; 0

:
Assumption C is satised if @H2 < @H1, that is, if 2 < 1. Assumption SC is satised if
@u2 > @u1, that is, if
1
1 + [(1  v2)=v2] exp( 2(L Q)) >
1
1 + [(1  v1)=v1] exp( 2(L Q)) ;
or, equivalently,
(2   1)(L Q) > ln

(1  v2)=v2
(1  v1)=v1

for all Q. The left-hand side of this inequality is an increasing function of Q when 2 < 1,
which leads to the condition given in the body of the paper. 
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